PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

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JO ANN SHAFFER

April 15, 1988

Ms. Diane M. Elder
Public Utilities Commission
State of California
505 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

Attention: Docket office

Reference: Application No. 87-10-018

(U-39E)

Dear Ms. Elder:

Enclosed for filing are an original and thirteen copies of the REPLY OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY TO RESPONSE OF DIVISION OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES TO APPLICATION FOR REHEARING OF D.88-02-029.

Please file the originals and return an endorsedstamped copy.

Very truly yours,

JO ANN SHAFFER

JAS:pr Enclosure

cc: All Appearances of Record - COT Project Administrative Law Judge Lynn Carew

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In the Matter of the Application of PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity Authorizing Participation in the California-Oregon Transmission Project.

Application 87-10-018 (Filed October 14, 1987)

(U39E)

REPLY OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY TO RESPONSE OF DIVISION OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES TO APPLICATION FOR REHEARING OF D.88-02-029

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April 15, 1988

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In the Matter of the Application of PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY for a certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity Authorizing Participation in the California-Oregon Transmission Project.

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INTRODUCTION

Ι

On April 6, 1988, the Division of Ratepayer Advocates of the Commission (DRA) filed a response (the Response) to the Application pursuant to Rule 86.2. In the Response, DRA requests the Commission to hold one or two days of hearings to make certain determinations regarding resolution of the so-called

south-of-Tesla issue, the issue which formed the basis for the Commission's rejection of the COT Project application.

PG&E hereby files a reply to DRA's Response.

II

BACKGROUND

PG&E's Application contains a description of the background of this case leading up to the Commission's Decision. After the Commission issued the Decision rejecting PG&E's initial appeal of the rejection of the COT Project application, PG&E filed an application for rehearing in accordance with Rules 85 and 86.1 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure specifically alleging that the Commission's Decision violates the Permit Streamlining Act (PSA) (Govt. Code 65920, et seq), and Public Utilities Code Section 1708.

In response to the Application, DRA believes that:

PG&E's Application should be dranted to the extent that the Commission hold one or two days of hearings to determine whether:

- (a) whether (sic) the "Transmission Principles" identified in PG&E's [CPCN] Application still represent even PG&E's position on South-of-Tesla arrangements;
- (b) whether (sic) any other mutually
 Le transmission arrangements
 between PG&E and the other coparticipants
 are likely to be reached in the near
 future;
- (c) whether (sic) intervening events since
 November 13, 1987, have significantly
 affected resolution of the south-of-Tesla
 issue. (Emphasis in original. Response,
 p.1)

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 DRA'S FILING IS NOT A "RESPONSE" AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER RULE 86.2

AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE DISREGARDED

Rule 86.1 requires an applicant to "set forth specifically the grounds on which the applicant considers the order or decision of the Commission to be unlawful or erroneous".

PG&E's Application complies with Rule 86.1 by specifically setting forth the legal errors which it believes requires a reversal of the Decision, and presents legal arguments and analysis supported with citations. Rule 86.2 provides for a response to an application for rehearing. A reasonable interpretation of that rule is that such a filing will respond to the arguments raised in the application for rehearing. DRA's filing does not do so.

There is a paucity of legal arguments or analysis in DRA's filing in response to the legal errors specifically set forth in G&E's Application. Instead, DRA's filing deals overwhelmingly, and almost exclusively, with factual information and questions regarding the so-called south-of-Tesla issue. If one eliminated the portions of DRA's filing not

E's

Application, one would be left with very little except a few conclusory, unsupported statements contending merely that the Commission has complied with the law.

DRA states that it believes that PG&E's Application should be "granted" to the extent that hearings should be held on the south-of-Tesla issue. The fallacy in this statement is that

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PG&E's Application did not request a hearing on this issue! How then can the Commission order hearings on that issue in the guise of "granting" PG&E's Application? PG&E contends it cannot. The only appropriate inquiry which can arise from PG&E's Application must be within the context of the allegations of legal error as contained therein. What then is the purpose of DRA's filing? It is, again, an effort to misuse the CPCN Application's completeness review as a device to address factual issues on the merits. This is improper.

In the first round of appeal on the COT Project CPCN application denial, the DRA failed to convince the Commission that it should be able to continue discovery in the absence of an accepted application. Now it. would go even further by using PG&E's Application as a vehicle not only to do discovery but to require hearings on what it perceives to be a major issue in the case - all prior to acceptance of the CPCN application. It is difficult to imagine a more flagrant violation of the Permit Streamlining Act and the Commission's procedures than to require hearings, within the context of an application for rehearing, on a factual issue as a prerequisite for acceptance of a CPCN application. The issue for decision now is whether the Commission committed legal error by redefining the project that is the subject of PG&E's CPCN application. The Commission says it did not; PG&E says it did. This is a legal question, the resolution of which will not be aided by DRA's proposed hearings.

Assuming, arguendo, that an application for rehearing of

Decision 88-02-029 is an appropriate procedure to trigger hearings and inquiry into a factual issue (a position with which PG&E disagrees), DRA's request must, still be denied. DRA did not file an application for rehearing but is simply responding to PG&E's Application. That DRA did not apply €or a rehearing of Decision 88-02-029 is understandable. The Decision affirmed rejection of PG&E's COT Project application -- the result sought by DRA. DRA could hardly file an application for rehearing of a Commission decision favorable to DRA, yet that is, in effect, what DRA proposes here.

ΙV

DRA'S CONTENTION THAT THE COMMISSION'S STATEMENT THAT IT DID NOT VIOLATE THE LAW IS EVIDENCE THAT IT HAS COMPLIED WITH THE LAW IGNORES THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

In it Application, PG&E contends that the Commission's manifest frustration with the time limit prescribed by the PSA for review of a CPCN does not license it to circumvent that limit by requiring information prior to acceptance which is properly pursued during hearings, particularly where, as here, that additional information was not required by the criteria list or permitted by the PSA. DRA's response to this statement is astonishing.

According to DRA, PG&E's contention cannot be true because, in effect, the Commission says it isn't true. DRA says that in the Decision "the Commission was careful in separating the difficulties of expedited consideration of the large, complex project from the legal basis of the rejection" (Response, p.11).

It then quotes from the Decision where the Commission states:

We do not believe, however, that we have the authority under the statutes to delay acceptance of an application in order to give ourselves and our staff greater time to consider the merits. (Emphasis deleted. Response, p.11)

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DRA apparently believes that because the Commission stated in the Decision that it was without authority to delay acceptance of the COT Project CPCN application in contravention of the applicable statutes, its rejection of the application was per se based on lawful grounds. If by the stroke of a pen the Commission can make an absolute determination of the lawfulness. of its actions, Public Utilities Code Section 1756 (which grants applicants the right to apply to the California Supreme Court for a review for the purpose of having the lawfulness of an order or It is not the decision determined) may as well be repealed. province of the Commission to ultimately determine if its actions comply with the law - it is the Court's. DRA apparently views the statements and action of the Commission as sacrosanct. This is simply not the case. Even the Coinmission must on occasion face the harsh light of judicial scrutiny. We now ask the Commission to rectify its legal error and eliminate the need for judicial review.

V

CONCLUSION

DRA criticizes PG&E's Application for its focus on "the narrowest of legal arguments and its complete disregard of the

facts" (Response, p.8). DRA's complaint ignores the fact that legal error is a basis for an application for rehearing, is evidence of its preoccupation with factual inquiry in this case to the exclusion of proper procedures, and demonstrates the weakness of its position on the legal issues raised by PG&E.

PG&E has appealed to the Commission for rehearing of its Decision on the basis of a violation of the law. DRA, faced without legal arguments supporting denial, uses its Response to l'ead for inquiry into factual matters. The Commission should disregard this request. PG&E has the right to have its Application for Rehearing judged on the issues which it has raised. DRA does not have the right to use PG&E's Application as a vehicle to compel hearings on the merits of a factual issue as a prerequisite for the Commission's decision on PG&E's Application,

Respectfully submitted,

HOWARD V. ESLUB DOUGLAS A. OGLESBY JO ANN SHAFFER

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Attorney for Petitioner
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

April 15, 1988

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PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL (C.C.P. Secs. 1013a(1) and 2015.5)

I, the andersigned, state that I am a citizen of the United
States and employed in the City and County of San Francisco; that I am
over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within
cause; that my Business address is 77 Beale Street, San Francisco,
California 94106; and that on the date set out below I deposited a
true copy of the attached

REPLY OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY TO RESPONSE OF DIVISION OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES TO PG&E'S APPLICATION FOR REHEARING OF D.88-02-029.

regularly maintained by the Government of the United States in the said City and County, addressed as follows:

(See attached Service List)

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct:

April 15, 1988

(Signature)